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BANK expansion through branching and bank
holding company acquisitions has been the subject
of nationwide discussion in recent years. Pressure
has come from larger banks for fewer restrictions on
branching and bank holding companies. The smaller
banks have generally resisted such pressure and at
the same time have- pressed for greater restrictions on
bank holding companies. Both groups have been ac-
tive in the Eighth Federal Reserve District, as indi-
cated by a number of recent changes in state laws.
The often-heated debates about branching and
multiple bank holding companies are concerned with
the effect of these multi-office organizations on bank-
ing structure — the number and size distribution of
banking organizations in an area. Of particular in-
terest is the effect on concentration — the extent to
which bank deposits are held in a few relatively
large banking organizations in a market or a state.
The debate, however, is fundamentally about the
effects of increased concentration, Those who favor
branching or hank holding company expansion typi-
cally argue that any increase in concentration results
from greater efficiency of these multi-office organi-
zations and leads to improvement in services. One
proponent of multi-office banking noted that in one
state with state-wide branch banking:
there was no evidence of damage when a
tiny, small-town bank, unable to pay the costs of
automating and updating its facilities, unable to pro-
vide new customer services, nnable to increase its
lending limits and obtain funds at competitive rates,
unable to attract and train top-notch bankers, agrees
—or asks for — a merger with a large institntion.1
On the other hand, opponents of multi-office banking
argue that it results in a concentration of economic
and political power, to the detriment of the public.
iAddress of Walter J. Chariton to the Illinois Manufacturers
Association, reprinted in American Banker (April 29, 1974).
As one opponent of multi-office banking put it:
Today we are once again threatened by supercon-
centrations of economic and political power Sneh
institutions, among them the multi-office giants of
banking, have grown away from the people, are no
longer responsive to the individual. It’s “the public
be damned,” all over again.2
This article examines banking structure in Eighth
District states, emphasizing concentration in states
and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).
The effects of regulation — especially regulation of
branching and holding company activity — on bank-
ing concentration are considered. Then, the effects of
concentration on hank performance are analyzed.
REGULATION’ AND BANKING
STRUCTURE IN’ EIGHTH DISTRICT
STATES
Bank structure can he directly affected by regula-
tion of entry, mergers, branching, and acquisitions
of banks by multiple hank holding companies. Since
state restrictions on entry and merger do not differ
significantly in the Eighth District, one would expect
to see little difference in bank structure among the
states due to entry or merger laws. On the other hand,
Eighth District state laws concerning branching and
multiple bank holding companies differ considerably
and may therefore contribute to differences in bank-
ing structure among the states,3 Less restrictive regu-
lation of branching and holding companies can affect
structure by resulting in more branches or subsidiary
banks and fewer independent banks. On the other
2Fred T. Brooks, “Independent Banking: A Hometown
Philosophy,” The Independent Banker (November 1973),
p. 6.
tmThe Appendix to this article provides some details of the
regulations on catty, merger,, branching, and multiple bank
hotding companies in each of the Eighth District states.
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Table I
ENTRY AND MERGERS IN EIGHTH DISTRICT STATES
loecemb r 31, 1968 Do timber I 1973)
Rottoof Numb
Change to of Merger to-
N mba of New Bank Ctostng Number of
Banks Banks M rg r Sank New B nks
On I 3ankJng Stoles
At’konsa S 8 00 0
tftinots 95 102 5 2 004
Mtssourt 19 22 2 1 009
I msted araach Barttctng
States
tct4iana 5 7 12 0 171
Kentucky —3 4 10 1 1 66
Misstssipp ‘—4 12 16 0 1 33
Tennesse 18 19 1 0 005
r anna I atarI a unitbank ag Ia ‘ tt 4 not 1 o branching uotti 17
Sot uaiR , Do tIn rn copor 1 in~ na ~Ia obtammierIIron, PDI
small r than tate if branch~ngis limited to such
areas. As the accompanying chart shows the concen-
tration of bank deposits in Eighth District SMSAs is
greater in limited branch banking states than in unit
banking states. The SMSAs included in the chamt are
the four largest SMSAs with population greater than
100 000 in each Eiahth District state except for Chi-
cago which is e eluded as atypical. The concentration
mea ure used is the four-bank concentrat on ratio’ —
the pe cent’nge of total hank deposits in an area
held by the four largest b’nnking organizations. Since
SMSAs can be taken a approximation of market
areas for many banking services the concentration
ratio can be interpreted a market concentration
ratios ~
hand, it is also possible that
branch banks or holding compa-
nies can increase the number of
banking organizations operating
in an area by establishing de
noon branches or banks in an




Illinois and Missouri are unit
banking states, as was Arkansas
until 1972. Arkansas now allows
limited branch banking, as do the
remaining states in the Eighth
District,4 There is no state-wide
branching in the District.
Effect of Branching on Entry and Merger — Op-
ponents of branching argue that branching will result
in a reduction in the number of independent banking
organizations. This is likely to occur partly because
branches will be opened where new banks might be
established if branching were prohibited, and partly
as a result of bank mergers. Such mergers are less
likely to occur in unit banking states because the
office of one bank would have to be closed or services
offered at one office restricted,
In recent yeai’s the limited branch banking states
in the Eighth District have had fewer new banks
established and more mergers than the unit banking
states. As indicated in Table I, the ratio of the num-
ber of mergers to the number of new banks from 1968
to 1973 ranges from zero to 0,09 for the unit banking The amount of business in a market also influences
states and from 0.05 to 1.71 for limited branch bank- concentration; as the amount of business expands,
ing states. The number of banks increased in the three the concentration of deposits generally declines. This
unit banking states and in one limited branch bank- can be seen most easily in a highly simplified example.
ing state, Tennessee, and decreased in the three other Suppose there is a size of bank that is associated with
limited branch banking states, minimum average cost and that entry is not regu-
lated, Because of competition among existing firms
Effect of Branching on SMSA Concentration — This
decreased entry and greater frequency of mergers
has resulted in a greater concentration of deposits in
branch banking states than in unit banking states.
High concentration is especially likely for areas
t
In unit banking states a bank may not have full-service
branches, although one or more limited-service facilities may
be permitted within a limited distance froni a hank’s home
office. In limited branch banking states, a bank may have
more than one full-service office but may not operate full-
service offices at locations throughout the state. Arkansas is
regarded as a unit banking state in the analysis that follows,




Banking markets are likely to be confined geographically be-
cause of the costs of visits to a bank. Only banks in a limited
area are likely to be relevant alternatives for many customers.
Various factors considered in defining SMSAs, such as com-
muting pattems, suggest that they are integrated economi-
cally. SMSAs as defined in 1970 are used with one change:
parts of SMSAs that are not in the same state as the central
city in the SMSA are excluded. For example, only the de-
posits in banks located in the Missouri portion of the St.
Louis SMSA are included in calculating the concentration
ratio for St. Louis. One reason for doing this is that banks
across a state line are likely to be less relevant alternatives
for bank customers. For example, it may be more difficult to
get a loan across a state line because costs associated with
bling mortgages and repossession in another state would be
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and entry of new firms, the average size of firms tends
to be that which is associated with mirnmum average
cost. Therefore, as a market expands new firms enter
and concentration falls, The SMSAs in the accompany-
ing chart are arranged on the basis of population —
a rough measure of market size — with the smallest
on the left and the largest on the right. The four-
bank concentration ratio tends to be lower in larger
SMSAs than in smaller ones. For areas of approxi-
mately the same size, concentration is higher in the
limited branch banking states than in the unit banking
states.
Multiple Bank Holding Company
Regulation and Structure
Most states in the Eighth District prolnhit the
formation of new multiple bank holding companies
or the acquisition of additional banks by any existing
holding companies. At present, only Missouri and
Tennessee allow formation of multiple bank holding
companies or further acquisitions by them. Recent
legislation in Tennessee prohibits acquisitions by mul-
tiple bank holding companies under certain circum-
stances. Legislation designed to restrict the size of
multiple hank holding companies has also been en-
acted in Missouri. Both laws reflect concern over
increased state concentration of hank deposits.
Recent Acticity — In the last five years, the number
of multiple hank holding companies has increased
substantially in Missouri and Tennessee. In Missouri,
there were 3 such companies at the end of 1968 and
24 at the end of 1973~in Tennessee, there were 3 at
the end of 1968 and 9a tthe end of 1973. The number
of banks in Missouri controlled by these holding
companies at ycar-end 1973 was 144, 12 times the
number of banks controlled at the end of 1968.
Holding companies in Tennessee now control 48
banks, more than 5 times the number of banks con-
trolled at the end of 1968. Acquisitions of existing
banks account for the majority of the increase in sub-
sidiary banks, hut 7 banks in Missouri and 1 bank
in Tennessee were chartered as de novo subsidiaries.
The shares of bank deposits in Missouri and Ten-
nessee controlled by multiple hank holding companies
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Percentage of Deposits in SMSAs Held by Four Largest Banking Organizations
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have increased dramatically in the last five years.
These companies controlled 9.4 percent of total NIis-
souri bank deposits in 1968 and 55 percent in 1973.
In Tennessee, they controlled 3.5 percent of total
bank deposits in 1968 and 49 percent in 1973.
However, examining the effect of multiple bank
holding companies on the share of state deposits in
this way overstates the increase in the share of state
deposits controlled by large organizations. The de-
posits in Missouri and rre that are controlled
by holding companies consist largely of deposits in
the companies’ lead banks. At year-end, deposits in
lead banks were 37.1 percent of Missouri hank de-
posits and 39 percent of Tennessee hank deposits.
These percentages accounted for 67.3 and 79.6 per-
cent of the total deposits controlled by multiple hank
holding companies in Missouri and Tennessee, re-
spectively. Thus, while the proportion of state deposits
controlled by holding companies has increased dra-
matically, that increase primarily represents forma-
tion of holding companies by larger banks, rather than
an increase in the concentration of deposits in large
banking organizations.
State Concentration — A preferable way of look-
ing at the effect of holding company acquisitions
on concentration is to consider the effect on state
concentration ratios, the share of deposits in a state
held by a specified number of the largest banking
organizations. l’his diffcrs from looking at the share
of deposits controlled by all multiple hank holding
companies, since the smaller holding companies are
not considered and the number of organizations is
held constant.
If it is assumed that deposits of subsidiary banks
grew at the same rate after acquisition as they would
have without acquisition, then the increase in con-
centration is simply the difference between the actual
concentration ratio and a calculated ratio which as-
sumes no banks were acquired after 1968. Thus, it is
estimated that multiple bank holding companies in-
creased the four-hank concentration ratio by 9.4 per-
centage points in Missouri and 4.4 percentage points
in Tennessee (see Table II). The comparable figures
for the ten-hank concentration ratios are 12.8 per-
centage points for Missouri and 10 percentage points
for Tennessee.
SMSA Concentration — The same procedure can be
used to estimate the effect of multiple bank holding
companies on the four-bank concentration ratios in
SMSAs. No Tennessee holding company owned more
than one hank in any of the four largest SMSAs by
Tab U
ONCENTRATION OP DEPOSITS IN LARGE
BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
(December 3!, 1973)
Percentage of Deposits Keld by ou Largest Banking
Orgcetelzatle,ns in the State
Athtot Ne~qcqurtten met aLe
Co cent often Con erctrat’oni in
Ratio Rottal Cone n$rcstten
Mtsaet 319% 225%
Tetseto ee LS 32 1 4 4
Percentage of Depeette tieM by Ten Largest aenk tsp
Ovganfrati*tn in the State
Act at No acq ‘ con Ln ease
Certc it rot on on entrotorc
~Ir to tcttto en entrcrti*ts~
M oo 4 4°. 33,4% lfl%
Tents ~. 6 7 527 it)
TIs ru,- C cnn m a
t 1~ itt m a t , a
bol no a tOt
cot i dix in S ‘ cons-
Pa 5 1a Decent 1 197
S actual en m n to
the end of 1973. If it is true that affiliation with a
holding company neither increases nor decreases a
hank’s growth, then in l’ennessee multiple bank hold-
ing companies have not affected SMSA concentration.
On the other hand, holding companies have acquired
two or more banks each in some Missouri SMSAs. In
St. Louis, the concentration in the four largest bank-
ing organizations is 3.7 percentage points higher than
the 44.7 percent without such acquisitions; in Kansas
City, concentration is 5.3 percentage points higher
than the 52.4 percent; and in Springfield, it is 4 per-
centage points higher than the $2 percent without
such acquisitions. Undoubtedly, a contributing cause
to this difference between Missouri and Tennessee is
the prohibition of branch banking in Missouri and
permission of county-wide branching in Tennessee.
INTERPRETING HIGHER
CONCENTRATION
The foregoing discussion has shown that less re-
striction of branching and multiple hank holding
companies is associated svith higher concentration,
hut has given no basis for evaluating the significance
of higher concentration. This is at the heart of the
controversies about branch banking and multiple bank
holding companies. An increase in a concentration
ratio merely says that the percentage of deposits held
by the largest banks has increased. It is the expected
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effects of this increase on the performance of the
banking organizations that are of interest, not the
increase itself.
Increases in concentration of banking resources in
states have a completely different interpretation than
increases in SMSAs. Concentration in a state is an
aggregate concentration measure; concentration in an
SMSA is a measure of market concentration. The
essential aspects of an aggregate concentration meas-
ure are that it is measured for a political entity, that
it includes several markets, and that it emphasizes
the relative sizes attained by some firms operating in
several markets. Market concentration is measured,
to the extent possible, for a geographic market — “the
area within which the price of a commodity tends to
uniformity, allowance being made for transportation
costs.”0
State Concentration
The effects some observers have attributed to an
increase in banking concentration at the state level
are on the prices charged and influence over the
state government’s legislative process.7 It is argued
that the effect on market prices occurs through the
ability of large organizations operating in several
markets to agree among themselves and to intimidate
smaller firms. The effect of large organizations on the
legislative process occurs because:
Large corrspanies start with certain initial political
disadvantages because they are in the spotlight, be-
cause there is some suspicion of their power, and
because small companies are more numerous. How-
ever, the large company can often overcome its
handicap and obtain a decided advantage by political
expenditures. The campaign contributions of large
companies and the occasional case of direct or in-
direct bribery are probably the least significant sources
of the large company’s political power. More impor-
tant, the large company spends whatever money is
needed to argue efiectively on behalf of its interest
where a political issue affects it. .. .While some
smaller business interests make a comparable show-
ing through associations set up for the purpose, the
experience of a Washington official is that small
companies generally find out what is happening too
late and prepare their cases too scantily and hastily
to be fully effective where their interests conflict with
those of large companies.t
Mutual Forbcanance — The hypothesis that bank
holding companies operating in several markets can
agree on, and therefore affect, prices in those markets
can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose
there are ten banking markets in a state and two
banks in each market. Initially these banks are in-
dependently owned, but subsequently each of two
holding companies in the state acquires one bank
in each market. The hypothesis — sometimes called
“mutual forbearance” — is that the two holding com-
panies would be more likely to reach an agreement
to raise prices in the ten markets than would the two
banks in each market separately.° Thus, the prices
paid for services by bank customers would be ex-
pected to rise on average.
But are there really forces leading to mutual for-
bearance? Would the two holding companies in this
example be more likely to agree than the twenty
individual banks?
The arguments supporting this hypothesis are that
the benefits from such an agreement would be greater,
and the costs of deviating from it — chiseling — would
also be greater than if all the banks were individually
owned. One agreement, instead of ten, could apply
to all markets; therefore, the benefits would be greater
from an agreement. If one of two banks in a market
cheated on the agreement, that is, lowered prices for
at least some customers, then the decrease in prices
would occur in only one market. But if one of the
two holding companies cheated in a market, then the
“price war could spread to all markets. Thus, the
costs of deviating from an agreement would also be
greater.
The mutual forbearance hypothesis is not, however,
substantiated by any empirical tests for banking or
other sectors of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the
arguments for it are less than completely convincing.
The inherent desirability of one agreement is dubious.
The primary defect of one overall agreement is the
existence of different demand and cost conditions in
different markets; under these conditions, ten separate
~Edwards, “Conglomerate Bigness,” pp. 346-47.
°Anincrease in state concentration of deposits does not, how-
ever, necessarily reflect an increase in the probability of mu-
tual forbearance. Snch an increase may result from deposit
growth in only one bank or acquisitions in markets where no
other state-wide banking organizations operate. In these cases,
banking organizations would not be facing each other in
more markets than before.
tt
George J. Stigler, The Tlteory of Price (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 85.
~These are the effects briefly mentioned by Samuel H. Talley,
“The Impact of Holding Company Acquisitions on Aggregate
Concentration iu l3anking,” Staff Economic Stvdies, no. 80,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, pp. 1-2.
The problem is analytically the same as that discussed by
Cot-win D. Edwards, “Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of
Power,’ Business Concenmtt’ation and Price Policy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 331-52, and in an ac-
companying “Comment” by George W. Stocking, pp. 352-59.
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agreements could be superior from the holding com-
panies’ point of view. Also, it has in no way been
established that an appropriate response to chiseling
in one market would be a price war in all ten markets.
This would only ensure that the decreased “profits”
in one market would spread to ten markets.
Predatory Pricing — The ability of large organiza-
tions operating in several markets to discipline smaller
ones operating in one market is tile other alleged way
that large organizations could increase prices paid by
customers, In other words, if a small firm should be so
hold as to chisel, it is argued that the larger organiza-
tion would respond by cutting its prices in order to
decrease the “profits” of the small chiseler)0 This
practice has often been called “predatomy pricing”
or “cutthroat competition.” It may be designed either
“to teach the chiseler a lesson,” to drive him into a
merger, or to force him out of business. The large firm
would have no differential advantages when it cuts
prices unless it incurs costs greater than its revenue.
Both the larger and the smaller firms would simply
make less “profit” than they would othenvise. The
large firm could only have a differential advantage
when it is incurring losses.
The advantage attributed to large firms when they
cut prices below their cost and their competitors’
costs is superior access to capital — a lower price paid
for capital. They could finance the losses at a lower
cost than smaller firms; therefore, they would have a
differential advantage in a price war. This lower cost
of capital to large firms purportedly exists because the
price war could be financed by funds generated in
other markets where the larger firms are receiving
“monopoly profits.” But the large firm would not really
have a lower cost of capital. The cost of anything is
the highest-valued alternative foregone. And as long
as one of its alternatives would be to loan to a small
firm (with a cost of capital the same as the small firm
it is trying to intimidate), then this alternative would
be superior to financing a price war.
An additional argument against the likelihood of
predatory pricing is summarized by George J. Stigler
in a fictional discussion in which a potential victim of
predatory pricing by John D. Rockefeller tells a
lender:
lOTHs decrease need not involve a price cut below marginal
cost, as has been argued by B. S. Yamey, “Predatory Price
Cutting: Notes and Comments,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics (April 1972), pp. 129-42. He also provides a sum-
mary and evaluation of the literature generated by the
classic paper on this subject, John S. McGee, “Predatory
Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, Journal of
Law and Economics (October 1958), pp. 137-69.
“There is a threat of a three-month price war, dur-
ing which I will lose $10,000, which unfortunately I
do not possess. If you lend me the $10,000, I can
survive the price war — and once I show your certi-
fied check to Rockefeller the price war will probably
never be embarked upon. Even if the price war
should occur, we will earn more by co-operation after-
ward than the $10,000 loss, or Rockefeller would
never embark upon the strategy.”
And indeed, Rockefeller did buy out his rivals rather
than try to drive them out of business by such tactics.
It is noteworthy that one cannot conceive that bank
regulators would allow a price war. As a matter of
fact, much of bank regulation is designed to suppress
price competition, replacing it with other forms of
competition. As Ray lvi. Gidney, a recent Comptroller
of the Currency, said:
I think the important thing we should hope for is
a degree of enlightenment on the part of people that
run these banks so that they go out and give service.
That is where we ~vant competition, competition in
giving service)2
Concentration of Political Power — For large firms
to have a disproportionate effect on legislation, it
would he necessary for them to have a differential
advantage in contributing to political campaigns, de-
livering votes, or providing information to legislators.
These are the three means by which politicians’ votes
in legislatures can be influenced.13
At least in banking, there is no presumption what-
soever that large organizations have any differential
superiority in any of these activities. Campaign con-
tributions by corporations are illegal, and therefore
will not generally be made. The wealth position of
small banks’ stockholders generally would be more
substantially affected by banking legislation than the
wealth position of stockholders of large banking
organizations. Therefore, the small number of stock-
holders of numerous small banks arc more likely to
make contributions and vote on the basis of legislators’
votes on banking legislation than are the numerous
stockholders of a few holding companies. It is also
unlikely that large holding companies have any supe-
riority over small banks in supplying information to
“George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Home-
wood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 116.
‘
2
U. S. Congress, Senate, Regulation of Bank Mergers, 86th
Cong., 1st sess., 1959, Committee on Banking and Currency,
p. 31. For an economic analysis of why producers prefer to
substitute nonprice cosnpetitinn for price competition, see
Stigler, The Organization of Industry, pp. 23-28.
l:isee Albert Bretnu, The Economic Theory of Representative
Gocernrnent (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1974), pp.
74-98.
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legislators. Bankers, through state and independent
bankers associations, are well organized, whether they
are large or small.
Thus, just as increased state concentration does not
necessarily have any effects through mutual forbear-
ance or predatory pricing, there is no substantial
effect of increased state concentration on the legis-
lative process.
Market Concentration
There are two hypotheses related to increased mar-
ket concentration. One hypothesis is that increased
concentration is associated with lower prices charged
to customers due to the efficiency of large-scale op-
erations. According to the second hypothesis, in-
creased concentration facilitates agreement — explicit
or tacit collusion — about prices in the market and is
thus associated with higher prices charged to custom-
ers.14 Those who are in favor of relatively few re-
strictions on branching and acquisitions by multiple
bank holding companies assert the first hypothesis
when presenting their views. Those who are opposed
to branching and holding company acquisitions of
banks refer to the second hypothesis when interpret-
ing the higher concentration whiclm results from
branching and multiple bank holding companies.
Efficiency — The hypothesis relating efficiency and
concentration is an attempt to answer an important
question: How does higher concentration develop?
Higher concentration is synonomous with higher mar-
ket shares of the larger firms. The arguments advanced
in the discussion of state concentration imply that high
market concentration does not result from predatory
pricing by larger firms.
A firm’s larger share of a market means that a larger
percentage of the business in the market is going to
that firm. This larger share of the business must re-
sult because customers prefer that firm to others, per-
haps because of a lower price or a higher-quality
product. Thus, it can he argued that concentration is
higher because some firms are relatively more efficient.
This argument is weaker for banking than for other
industries because of entry and branching regulations.
Implicit in the argument is the assunmption that the
most efficient firms in servicing customers are those
tm4The use of the term “collusion” in this paper is not to be
confused with the legal definition. Collusion as used in this
paper includes legal collusion and a great deal more — any
explicit or implicit agreement — not just explicit agree-
ments. Those setting the prices need not even intend to
agree; they need only act as if they agree.
that are presently operating and that expansion is
largely determined by relative efficiency. But entry
regulation is designed precisely to protect existing
banks from the conmpetition of new banks; this is also
a consideration in branching applications. Also, bank-
ing regulators determine to some extent who receives
charters and which banks grow through branciming.
The interests of regulators and bank customers are
not necessarily coincident.
Existing empirical evidence does not falsify the
hypothesis that increased concentration results from
the relative efficiency of larger banks.~’
Collusion — The increased concentration, according
to the second hypothesis, facilitates collusion among
banks. Just as a single firm operating in a market
maximizes the wealth of all the owners of the firm, an
agreement between firms operating in a market can
maximize the wealth of all the owners of the firms.
There is, of course, a problem of distributing the gains
from the agreement, a problem which does not arise
for a monopoly.
Each of the firms in a market can increase the
wealth of its owners if it cheats on the agreennent
while all other firms adhere to it, The chiseling can
take various forms. It may be secret price cutting,
changes in credit terms, or changes in the quality of
the product in some other way. Whether the firm is
cutting its pecuniary prices or making the nonpecu-
niary terms of its sales more attractive to buyers, it
will desire to keep its actions secret. If the other firms
I ‘Much of the literature on the relationship between bank’s
sizes and efficiency— so-called “economies of scale” — is
reviewed and analyzed in Jack M. Guttentag and Edward
S. Herman, “Banking Structure and Performance,” The
Bulletin of New York University Graduate School of Business
Administration (February 1967), pp. 105-25, 169-96. Two
recent studies are: Frederick W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy,
“Costs in Commercial Banking,” Federal Resen’e Bank of
Boston Research Report No. 41; and Lionel Kalish III and
B. Alton Gilbert, “An Analysis of Efficiency of Scale and
Organizational Fonn in Commercial Banking,” Journal of
Industrial Economics (July 1973), pp. 293-307. The empirical
evidence generally indicates that banks of less than about
810 mnillion deposit size are relatively high-cost banks and
that other banks probably have about the same average cost.
There are, however, unresolved conceptual and measure-
n,ent problems, which apply to all studies of economies of
scale in banking, that imply the empirical evidence must he
interpreted carefully, Two of these problems are the
inability to account arlequately for changes in the types of
deposits received and loans made as sizes of banks expand
and the individual nature of banks’ cost functions. For elab-
oration and analysis of the latter problem, see Milton Fried-
man’s “Coimnent,” pp. 230-38, on Caleb A. Smith, “Sun•ey
of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale,” pp. 213-
30, in Business Concentration and Price Policy, and Harold
Demsetz. “Industry Structure. Market Rivalry, and Public
Policy,” Journal of Law and Economics (April 1973), pp.
1-9. Interpreted in the light of Friedman’s and Demnsetz’s
analyses, the empirical evidence is consistent with larger
banks being larger because they are more efficient.
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find out, they will take account of the price cutter’s
actions and set a lower price or improve the non-
pecuniary terms of their sales.
This antagonism between the interests of the firms
with an agreement is the basis of the relationship
between market concentration and the prices charged
customers in markets. TIme smaller the number of firms
in an agreement and the larger their relative market
shares, the easier effective collusion is likely to be.’°
Another enemy of collusion, second to existing firms’
mutual antagonism, is entry of new firms into the
market. Those not presently in the market are not
part of the agreement and, seeing the returns being
received by firms in the market, are likely to be in-
duced to enter. If they are subsequently made part
of the agreement, the returns to those originally col-
luding are diluted. If they are not made part of the
agreement, then the effect on the collusive prices is
the same as that of a discovered chiseler — a lower
price.
Entry and the possibility of it can attenuate the
relationslup between concentration and prices. But
regulation of entry in banking effectively protects
many markets from entry and in all cases reduces the
probability of entry.
If increased collusion follows from increased con-
centration, oue would expect to observe higher loan
rates and higher rates of return for banks. The exist-
ing empirical evidence does not falsify this hypothesis
either.~
‘°ThoniasR. Saving, ‘‘Concentration Ratios anml the Degree of
Monopoly,” International Economic Review (February
1970), pp. 139-46, briefly presents the theory behind the
concentration ratio as a concentration nmeasure. George j.
Stigler ‘A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy (February 1964), pp. 44—61, analyzes the mutual
antagonism and relates enforcement costs to the Ilerfindahl
index of coocemitration Coocentral ion ratios and Ilerlimmdahl
indexes are highly correlated.
T
Cnttentag and Ilermnan, ‘‘Baoking Structure and Perform-
ance,” pp. 80-104, also review the evidence accumulated
before 1967 on the relationship between concentration,
prices, and “profits.” Additional evidence is provided by
Donald P. Jacobs, Business Loan Costs and Baok Market
Structu,y: An Empirical Estimate of Their Relations, Oc-
casiommal Paper 15, National Buream of Economic Research,
and Arnold Heggestad, “Market Structure, Risk, and Profit-
abihty in the Banking Industry,” in Proceedings of a con-
ference on Bank Structure and Conmpetition, Federal Resert’e
Bank of Chicago, 1972. Taken as a whole, the empirical evi-
dence is consistent with a statement that higher concentra-
CONCLUSION
The controversies over branching and multiple bank
holding company expansion are concerned with the
effect of these multi-office organizatiorms on concen-
tration. In larger SMSAs, the Eighth District states
with limited branch banking tend to have higher
concentration of deposits in the four largest banking
organizations than the unit banking states. State con-
centration has increased as a result of the rapid ex-
pansion of multiple bank holding companies in Mis-
souri and Tennessee. but the effect on SMSA con-
centration has been somewhat less.
These findings are of little interest until the impli-
cations of increased concentration are assessed. It has
been shown that there are no convincing arguments
and no empirical evidence that state concentration
has any significance. On the other hand, evidence has
been advanced which supports both the hypothesis
that increased market concentration results from the
efficiency of large organizations and the hypothesis
that increased concentration facilitates collusion
amnong the organizations. The relationship between
efficiency and concentration, by itself, implies that
banks’ customers gain as a result of higher concentra-
tion; but the relationship between collusion and con-
centration, by itself, implies that banks’ customers lose
as a result of higher concentration. Less restrictions on
branching and multiple bank holding companies is
associated \vith higher concentration. Therefore, there
are both potential benefits and costs for banks’ cus-
tomers from such lessened restrictions.
Since it is so oftemm thought to be implied, it is nec-
essary to point out that this amalgam of collusion and
efficiency does not imply that omniscient regulators
could weigh the costs and benefits of higher concen-
tration and determine a more “optimal” banking struc-
ture than that which would develop by pernnitting
free market forces to operate. Such a weighing process
is impossible. The evidence regarding both costs and
benefits is imprecise and hobbled by the use of avail-
able accouotbmg data to measure economnic concepts.
It is unlikely that the factors that result in imnprecision
will soon be overcome and even more unlikely that
present accounting data can he replaced by more
relevant data.
tion results in higher rates on loans and higher rates of retum
for banks.
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DISTRICT STATES
Regulation of banking can directly affect bnnking eral banking officials consider the future earnings pros-
structure through limitations on entry, mergers, branch- pects of the bank and the effect of emmtry on the “sound-
ing, and acquisitions of banks by multiple bank holding ness” and earnings prospects of existing banks. They also
companies. All of these activities are subject to regula- consider the effect of the new bank on the “convenience
tion at both the Federal and state levels.’ and needs of the community to be served”— that is, the
extent to which the new bank might provide more serv-
Entry ices or services at lower cost than are currently available.
The state laws, which are similar to the Federal laws, are
Before a bank may begin operations, Federal or state outlined in Table A-IT.
banking officials must grant a charter to the banlc’s or-
ganizers, The division of authority for examining charter The concern of bank chartering agencies that existing
applications, as well as applications for other actions dis- banks not be hurt by new entry and that new banks
cussed in this Appendix, is shown in Table A-I. meet a needs cnterion has resulted in fewer banks be-
mug chartered than would have been in the absence of
One purpose of entry regulation is to prevent a new such regulation.2 One effect of this relative difficulty of
bank from opening where it might fail or its opening entry has been to limit the development of competition
might cause an existing bank to fail. Therefore, the Fed- in banking.
Table A-i
D vmstan of Atithonrty Among Bank Regulutory Agencies
Agency Cberterrng Branching Metg
Comptroller ofthe Currency Na mental banks Natienot banks Result ng bank a national bank
Federal keserre Boa d State member bank State member baitks Resulting bank a state member
bank
Federal Ilepasit In u ance N~nmentberinsu ml state bank Nenmember insured tale bank Raw hap bank a norimembe
Corporation used bank
Sla e Banking Agencies All state banks A tale banks Resulting bank a late bank
‘5 os-mm ,man mm e edb bacomnm,tolt a Is s-n nd an aba a Is bautmeageal Tb
Federal nuB ev sv I, m,iseatlon S aetmm oa leak It Lis mnmab I, ntlmeved alit s-v S
ThFDir has- itt tvlsen non ~ 0mm t noon ban t 4 s-t ms-n.
‘For a more detailed discussion of Federal regulation, see
tm
For a discu.sion of entry into banking, see Sam Peltzman,
Gerald C. Fischer, American Banking Structure (New York: “Entry in Comnn,encial Baoking,” Journal of Law and Eeo-
Columnbia University Press, 1968). Tables at the end of this nomics (October 1965), pp. 11-50.
Appendix provide .somc of the details of state laws on entry,




State Rankjng Laws on Entry
In
5. Adverse Effect on Other
1. Persons Applying 2. Capital Requirements 3. Bank’s Prospects 4. Convenience& Needs Banks
Arkansas 5 or more qualified natural per- Requisite capital subscribed in There exists a public necessity —
sans, majority Arkansas resi- good faith,the minimum de- of the business of the cam-
dents, with confidence of pending on community size. munity.
community. Z
Illinois 5 or more incorporators, resi- Meets minimum capital require- Future earnings favorable. Convenience and needs of area
dents of Illinois, with general ments, the minimum depending sought ta be served will be pro-
character such that ‘reasonable an community size, mated,
promise af successful operation r
exists.”
(‘I
Indiana 10 or more natural persons of Meets minimum capital require. Approval of Department of Approval by Department of Approval by Department of
lawful age, majority Indiana ments, the minimum depending Financial Institutions “in its Financial Institutions ‘‘in its Financial Institutions ‘in its
residents. on community size, discretion’’, discretion’’, discretion’’.
Kentucky 5 or more persons for bank; 7 Meets minimum capital require- Reasonable assurance of suf. Public convenience and advan-
or mare for trust; 7 or mare for ments, the minimum depending ficient volume of business for tage will be promoted.
bank & trust; Ia or mare for on city size, success.
bank, trust, and real estate title.
Mississippi S or more persons offull age Capital stock and surplus re- Reasonable prospects of growth Determine whether the public Record of earnings and con-
and of goad morat and business quired, the minimum depending of the area and its financial re- necessity requires that the pro- dition of existing unitbanks
character. on community size, sources, expectationsof profit- posed new bank should be (not branch banks) and ef’
able operations. chartered and allowed to fed an them,
operate.
Missouri 5 or more persons with charac’ Requisite capital subscribed in Probable volume of business in Convenience and need of cam- Probable volume of business
ter, responsibility, and general good faith and paid in cash, locality sufficient to insure and munity justifyand warrant in locality sufficient to main-
fitness of person such as to com- lhe minimum depending on maintainsolvency of the new opening of new bank, lain solvency of new bank
mand confidence, community size, bank, and existing banks, without
endangering safety of any
bank.
Tennessee S or mare incorporators, ma- Adequate capital and surplus, Conditions in community afford Public need and advantages Need in community for new
only residents of Tennessee; the minimum depending on reasonable promise of successful promoted, bank, considering adequacy
proposed officers and directors community size, operation. of existing banks.
have sufficient experience,
ability, and standing to assure
reasonable promise of successful C
operation. r
ID
‘IFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JULY 1974
Table A.W
Stoic Banking Laws or’ Mergers
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Mc.gors allowed RenOir; hark P g:,’.cr.er’t ot ror.;rne.m’s mub. IAojor4 y of ‘aoa-d Ca’sc “t at ~
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Inslitit arms ‘ in
Its d,scr,mtion.
Mergers
Prior approval by a Federal banking agency is required
for all mergers resulting in an insured bank. If the result-
ing bank is to be a state bank, approval of state banking
officials is also necessary. The provisions of state laws on
mergers in Eighth District states are outlined in Table
A-Ill.
In deciding whether to approve or deny a merger ap-
plication, Federal banking officials are required by the
Bank Merger Act to consider the effects of the merger
on competition, the future prospects of existing and pro-
posed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the
community to be served. No merger which would result
in a monopoly or would tend to create a monopoly can
be approved. If a merger would result in a “substantial
lessening of competition,” it can be approved only if the
probable effects of the merger in meeting the conveni-
ence and needs of the community to be served clearly
outweigh the anticompetitive effect.
Branching
All banks in a state, whether national or state-chartered,
are subject to state laws concerning the locations of
branches, the number of branches allowed, the services
that may be offered, and the capital required for opening
a branch.
There are both unit banking and limited branch bank-
ing states in the Eighth District. The least restrictive
state law (Mississippi) permits branch banking within
100 miles of a bank’s home office. The provisions of the
present state la’vs are contained in Table A-IV, p. 22.
‘This tern, is not defined in legislation but refers to a less cx—
tremne retlmmction in competition than would result from crea-
tion of a monopoly.
Multiple Bank Holding Companies
Federal — Prior to 1956, the bank acquisitions of mul-
tiple bank holding companies were virtually free of
Federal regulation. The Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 brought this activity under Federal control by re-
quiring prior approval by the Federal Reserve Board of
any action resulting in ownership of 5 percent or more of
a bank’s stock by a company owning two or more banks.
In determining whether or not to approve an acquisition,
the Board was required to consider banking and com-
petitive factors, but the competitive factors were given
less emphasis than the so-called banking factors. In addi-
tion, acquisition of a bank outside a holding company’s
home state was prohibited, unless the acquired bank’s
state law specifically allowed such acquisitions.
Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act which
were passed in 1966 and 1970 shifted the emphasis from
banking factors to competitive factors and brought one-
bank holding companies under the Board’s supervision.
The 1966 amendments provided that the Board apply the
same tests in considering acquisitions by bank holding
companies that Federal officials apply in bank merger
cases. The 1970 Amendments brought companies owning
one bank under the purview of the Board,
State Formation of multiple bank holding comnpanies
is prohibited in the majority of the Eighth District states.
This has been the case for some time in Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, and Mississippi.
In 1971, an Arkansas law was passed which prohibits
companies from becoming multiple bank holding coin-
panics or existing holding companies from making any
further acquisitions; prior to that time, there had been no
restrictions on such companies in Arkansas. Until this year
Missouri and Tennessee had no restrictions on multiple
bank holding companies; both states now have laws
which limit the size of holding companies. The Tennessee
Bank Structure Act of 1974 places additional restrictions
on holding company acquisitions. Details of state laws
am-c provided in Table A-V. p. 23.
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State Banking Laws on Detached Offices
(a) Any bank.
(b) Banks in counties with
population less than
500,000 or having 3 or
more second-class cities.
(c) Banks in counties with
papulatian greater than
500,000 and less than 3
second-class cities.
(a) Any bank with capital
and surplus nat less than
$100,000 with principal of-
fice in an area with popula-
tion less than 8,000.
(b) Any bank with capital
and surplum not less than
$200,000 with principal of-
fice in a city with population
of 8,000 or more and less
than 20,000.
(c) Any bank in city with
population of 20,000 or
mare.
(a) Any bank.
Number of Detached Offices
No limit on number of full-
service branches.
(a) One branch for every





Within corporate limits of
home-office cityor lawn if
greater than 300 feet from
any other bank; inany city
ar town in home-office
county with population at
least 250 and no home office
at another existing bank; in
any planned community de-
velopment in home-office
county with population at
least 250, nothing allows
branches outside home-
office county.
Not more than 1500 feet
from home office and gen-
erally mare than 600 feet
from other banks’ premises.
(a) Anywhere in county.
(b) Any cityor town in
home-office county if no
bank located in the cityor
town,
(c) Any cityor town in
county.
(a) County-wide branching
except if home office ofan-
other bank in town or city
(but not branching bank’s
home-office town) or if
homeoffice of another bank
in unincorporated area with-
in one mile,
(b) Same as (a)
(c) Same as (a)
(a) Within home-office city
it population atleast 10,000
and within home office
countyan da d acent counties,
but nat in anycity ortown
with population less than
3500 and one or moreexist-
ing banks or branch banks-
(b) Within radius of 100
miles from home office, but
not in anycity or townwith
population less than 3100
and one or more existing
banks.
(a) Within lim its of city,
town, or village orunincor-
porated area in which home
office is located and home-
office county (but not within
400 feet of another bank
generaIly I
(b) In a town with popula-
tionof 1550 or less, which
does not hove banking serv-
ices and is not more than 10
miles from the bank’s main
office.
Receive deposits, cash and is-
sue checks, drafts and money
orders, change moneyand
receive payments on existing
debts.
(a) (Pawersaf bank.)
(a) Checks paid, deposits
receved, deposits with-
drawn, change made, ex-
change made, bank money
orders issued, safe deposit
boxes maintained and rented
and loan payments received,
(b) Same as (a)
1
,





All lawful banking activities









(b) Same as (a).
(c) Same as (a).
(a) Same powers as prin-
cipal office.
(b) Same as (a).
(c) Same as (al.
(a) (Pawersofbank.)
(b) Same as (al.
(a) One branch for each
$100,000 of capital and
surplus.
(b) One branch for each
$200,000 of capital and
surplus.
(c) One branch far each
$250,000 of capital and
surplus.
(a) Branch offices — no
limit.
(b) Branch banks— maxi-
mum of 15; capital require-
ments of $100,000 plus
minimum capital required
for unit bank at location.
(a) Two facitities.
(b) One facility.
No statutory limit on the
numberof branches.
(b) Same as (a).
(a) Any bank.
(b) Banks in third-class
counties with population of
35,000 or less.




State Banking Laws on Mulfiple Bank Holding Companies (MBHCs)
r
KENTUCKY MISSIS~PPI MISSOURI TENNESSEE
(a
1. Definition Company owning or Company owning or Company with 25% Any corporation with Incorporates defini’ P1
controlling 25% or controlling 15% or ownership, any obiect, purpose lion from Federal
mare of shares of more of shares of or powerof directly Bank Holding Com’ Ph
morethan one bank, morethan one bank, or indirectly organit- pony Act of 1956,05 (a
controlling election of ing, owning, or op- amended.
majority of directors erating banks in
of more thanane groups or chains.
bank, holding 15%
or more of voting
shares of more than ‘4




(a) Becoming on Unlawful Unlawful Unlawful No person (individ- Unlawful
MSHC ual or company) may
own or control mare
than one-half of the
capital stock in two
or more banks.
(b) Acquisitions Unlawful for an Unlawful for any Unlawful forMBHC No person controlling (Implicitly Holding companies No restrictions on ac-
MSHC to acquire as- MBHC to take actions to acquire greater morethan one.half unlawful.) whose bank subsid- quinn
9
banks which
sets of a bank, resulting in owning than 5% cantrol of of the capital stock in iaries have 13 per- have operated for
or controlling greater any bank; also un’ one bank may ac- cent or mare of total five years or more,
than5% of voting lawful for subsidiary quire any stock in commercial bank de- except that holding
shares of any bank, toacquireassets of another bank, posits in the state companies whose
any bank. (after the banks de- subsidiaries have
duct foreign deposits, 16.5 percent or more
certificates of de- of individual, per.
pasit of morethan sonal, and corporate
$100,000, and out- demand and savings
of-slate correspond- deposits may not ac’
ent deposits from quire any additional
their deposits) may banks.
not acquireaddi-
tional banks.
(c) Dc novo banks Unlawful (Implicitly (Implicitly (Implicitly Prohibited until
unlawful.) unlawful.) unlawful.) 1980, except in the
four largest counties.
(d) SHC mergers Unlawful (Implicitly Unlawful (Implicitly
unlawful.) unlawful.) r
p (e) Other Only closely related
activities.
to “J C-.,